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The reductionist program arose out of the logical positiv­
ist era, whenphilosophers of science judged all other sciences 
against the natural sciences, which were believed to be ideal 
models of what science should be. Taking this idea one step 
further, reductionists held that all other sciences were, at 
least theoretically, unnecessary. The basic premise of reduc­
tionism is that all the laws of science can be explained, and 
thus rendered superfluous, by physics (Garfinkel 443). Un­
derlying this assertion (often implicitly) is a belief in the 
symmetry of explanation and prediction; thus, standard 
reductionism believes that all the laws of science can be 
derived from the laws of physics. 
The reductionist thesis no longer stands as pure and 
unassailed as it did during the heyday of the logical positiv­
ists. Many authors have uncovered fatal flaws in the reduc­
tionists' views. Some philosophers take their arguments a 
stepfurther than merely destroying the idea of the unity of 
laws, though: they attempt to cast doubt upon the unity of 
science itself, asserting that the specialized scientific disci­
plines are necessarily autonomous from one another. This 
view is, I believe, too harsh. I intend to argue that while the 
sciences may not be unified by law, there is every reason to 
believe that they are unified by explanation. 
Explanatory Pervasion 
Due largely to the notion of what constitutes a law, 
reductionism can be shown to be untenable.1 But what of a 
reduction of sorts in the opposite direction? What if, instead 
Miller is a junior mathematics and physics major at Wartburg College. In May 
of 1996, he presented this paper to the Augustana Undergraduate Philosophy 
Conference and won Honorable Mention for Best Presentation. 
EPISTEME - VOLUME vm-S EPTEMBER 1997 
ANDREW MILLER 
of predicting a particular event solely from the laws of physics, 
I wish merely to explain it? Do such explanations exist? 
At least two authors do not think so. Alan Garfinkel and 
David Owens argue against what David Owens defines as 
explanatory pervasion: 
If the occurrence of an Sl-event explains the occur­
rence of an52-event then there are physical predicates 
Pl and P
2 
such that (a) the occurrence of a P1-event is 
sufficient for the occurrence of an 51-event, (b) the 
occurrence of a P2-event is sufficient for the occur­
rence of an 52-event, and (c) PI-events causally ex­
plain P2-events. (Owens 65) 
This is not identical to reductionism: for explanatory perva­
sion to be true, P1and P2 need not be related by law. All that 
is required is that we can explain the higher-level events in 
virtue of the physical mechanisms that connect them. 
Garfinkel posits that this is not possible. He illustrates his 
argument with the use of an example from ecology: a system 
of fluctuating populations of foxes and rabbits. Given that 
X(t) denotes the number of foxes at time t and Y(t) denotes the 
number of rabbits at time t, we can 
describe the behavior of such a system with a pair of differ­
ential equations2: 
dY'ff = aXY - bX, dt =pY -qXY 
Using these equations we can put forth some basic expla­
nations for phenomena in the system. For example, if the fox 
population is high, the rabbit popUlation will most likely be 
decreasing. Thus, if a particularrabbit gets caught and eaten, 
we can say that If [t ]he cause of the death of the rabbit was that 
the fox population was high" (Garfinkel 446). According to 
Garfinkel, this is the macroexpla11.ation of the rabbit's death, for 
it appeals to high-level scientific laws. We can attempt a 
microexplanation, of the event as well; Garfinkel suggests 
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L/[r]abbit rwas eaten because he passed through the capture 
space of fox f' (Garfinkel 447). 
t
He goes on to argue that these explanations are not 
equivalent,because their objects are not the same: the macro­
object is the death of the rabbit, whereas the micro-object is 
the deathofthe rabbit at the hands offoxf, atplacep, at time 
f etc. Thus, this micro explanation is inadequate in that it is 
hyperspecuic - it fails to account for small perturbations in 
the initial conditions. One can suppose that had the rabbit 
escaped death at the hands of foxf, he probably would have 
suffered the fate at the hands of some other fox, assuming the 
fox population remained high (Garfinkel 447). But our 
microexplanation does not tell us this. Neither, then, does it 
tell us how the rabbit might have avoided being caught, and, 
as Garfinkel points out, an explanation is inadequate if itdoes 
not lend itself to use for prediction and prevention (Garfinkel 
448). 
From these assertions, Garfinkel sets forth an alternate 
conception of explanation. He associates with each event a 
sort of phase space of initial conditions, where, small changes 
in the initial conditions do not result in major changes in the 
qualitative results except at certain critical points. 
The crucial thing we want to know is how this set of 
critical points is embedded in the substratum space, 
for that will tell us what is really relevant and what is 
not. Therefore, what is necessary for a true explana­
tion is an account of how the underlying space is 
partitioned into basins of irrelevant differences, sepa­
rated by ridge lines of critical points. (Garfinkel 452) 
Is this impression of explanation really all that different 
from the standard account? To answer this question, weneed 
look only so far as the boundary lines in Garfinkel's explana­
tion space. Now, there are two ways of interpreting these 
boundary lines: 1) we can explain, in lower terms, why these 
boundary lines determine the changes in the system, or 2) 
these critical points are an inexplicable property of the sys­
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tem itself. If the first interpretation is true, though, we really 
don't have a new definition of explanation at all: Garfinkel's 
idea collapses into a more standard conception of explana­
tion, in which higher-level laws can be explained, if not 
derived, using more basic laws. So Garfinkel's use of his 
phase-space model of explanation to support the disunity of 
science hinges upon whether these critical points are unac­
countable features of high-level systems. I assert that this is 
not so, for reasons which I shall now explore. 
The untenable nature of Garfinkel's arguments becomes 
clearerwhenwe consider an idea which led him to the phase­
space model of explanation: redundant causality. Garfinkel 
feels that in systems such as the fox-rabbit ecology, citing a 
particular physical mechanism of the resulting event (e.g., 
citing how the rabbit died) is irrelevant because 
[s]ystems which exhibit redundant causality ... 
have, for every consequent Q, a bundle of 
antecedents (P) such that: 
1. If anyone of the Pi is true, so will be Q. 
2. If one Pi should not be the case, some other 
will. (Garfinkel 448) 
Now, I don'ttake issue with (1) - it is just a reformulation 
of what David Owens calls the multiple realization point, the 
idea that each non-physical state can have associated with it 
many subvenient phYSical states. I must, however, disagree 
with (2). This aspect states that Q is in some way inevitable 
- no matter what happens, the universe will contrive to 
assure that some physical mechanism sufficient for Q will 
take place. To me, this is excessively speculative; it ascribes 
to the universe more order (indeed, almost an intelligence) 
than itcould reasonably have. Furthermore, it flies in the face 
oHact. !tis easily conceivable (though perhaps unlikely) that 
our rabbit could have escaped all of the foxes and gone on to 
live a long and happy life; his fate was never a foregone 
concl usion. 
This whole issue can be resolved if one realizes that 
Garfinkel's redundant causality is nothing more than a thinly 
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veiled theory of probabilistic laws. Based on the high fox 
population, the rabbit's death was highly probable, but not 
guaranteed. Hence, we could say'at any given time t, the 
probability that the rabbit will be caught by a fox is high.' 
This probabilistic formulation captures all of the important 
features of Garfinkel's redundant causality: (1) is assured 
because we know that every time t will have associated with 
it a certain physical setup, and among those setups will be 
many that are sufficient (but not necessary) for the death of 
the rabbit; (2) is covered, and improved, by the fact that itwill 
be highly improbable, but still possible, that the rabbit should 
survive for a long period of time. 
Now thatwe recognize redundant causality as a probabi­
listic system, we can attempt anappropriate micro explanation 
ofthefox-rabbitecology. To begin, we calculate theprobabil­
ity of an individual rabbit r's being caught and eaten in a 
given period of time t (denoted by P(rEt)). The differential 
equations tell us that in a given unit of time, the number of 
rabbits that are eaten is -qXY. The probability of a single 
rabbit's being eaten is that number divided by the total 
number of rabbits at that time, that is: 
qXY
P(rEt) = y == qX 
From this, we see that the probability of an individual rabbit's 
being eaten depends only on the number of foxes in the 
system! 
We can explain this by taking the original 
luicroexplanation (that the rabbit was eaten because he en­
tered the fox's capture space) as a starting point and asking 
why this mechanism was likely to occur, i.e., asking why it 
was nomologically expectable that the rabbit should enter a 
fox's capture space. It is reasonable to suppose that the size 
of an individual fox's capture space (relative to rabbits) is a 
function of both the rabbit's and the fox's attributes (their 
individual speeds, reaction times, senses of smell, etc.). So we 
let S(AR' A ) denote the size of this capture space, where AR 
F
and A are the relevant attributes of rabbits and foxes. Then 
F 
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the total area covered by the capture spaces of all the faxes at 
any time t is less than or equal to X S(AR' AF) ("less than or 
equal to" because of the possibility of separate faxes having 
overlapping capture spaces). Assurrring that the foxes and 
rabbits are confined to a region with area R, we can say that 
the probability that a rabbit will be in the capture space of a 
fox, and hence the probability of his being eaten, is given by 
P(rEt) s; X·S (AR' AJ 
R 
which is, as we predicted, a function of the number of foxes 
in the system. 
And so we have a formula, stated in terms of probabili­
ties, spatio-temporal coordinates, and the biological attributes 
of foxes and rabbits, that is a potential explanation of the 
behavior at the sociological level. The adequacy of this 
explanation can be tested by applying the conditions stated 
earlier by Garfinkel - namely, that an adequate explanation 
must lend itself to prediction and prevention. Clearly, with 
this model I am able to predict how likely it is for anyone 
rabbit to die, and from there to derive the overall results at the 
sociological level. This model also shows me what I must do 
if I wish to prevent the death of rabbits (or at least slow down 
the population decline). I can do one of three things: decrease 
the number of foxes; decrease the size of the foxes' capture 
spaces by improving my rabbits or somehow handicapping 
myfoxes; or increase the region inwhich the foxes and rabbits 
are confined. Of these three, only one is demonstrated in the 
original differential equations - the other two are "hidden" in 
the constant q. It appears that I have a successful 
micro explanation that actually has more descriptive content 
than the macro-explanation! 
So we see that Garfinkel's arguments are insufficient to 
show the absence of explanatory links between the higher­
level scientific laws and physics. The case is far from closed, 
however. The systems considered so far by Garfinkel and 
myself are a good deal less complicated than many systems 
which arise in the higher-level sciences. Whereas the ex­
amples so far have been ones in which the physical realiza­
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tions of the higher-level events have been largely homoge­
neous, there are many cases in which the physical mecha­
nisms are quite different from one another. In these cases, 
one would need to formulate a separate exp lanation for each 
type of mechanism. 
David Owens makes this point when he considers (in a 
more direct fashion than Garfinkel) the thesis of explanatory 
pervasion in light of an economic example: a monetary 
exchange. Owens looks at Fisher's Law, which states that if 
there is an increase in the money supply in an economic 
system, then there will be an increase in prices (Owens 62). 
Now, increases in the money supply and increases in prices 
can be realized in many ways. The discovery of a new gold 
mine, the exploitation of a new industry; the lowering of 
interest rates, and so forth are examples of an increase in 
money supply. Similarly, raises in prices can be reflected in 
the real estate market, the agricultural industry, the enter­
tainment industry, and every other market in the economic 
system. Thus, the PI and P in the explanatory pervasion z 
thesis shall have to be broadened to allow us to apply them 
to heterogeneous sets of physical mechanisms. The multiple 
physical realizations of these economic predicates shows us 
that a necessary condition for the truth of explanatory perva­
sion is agglomerativity: ,/ AgglOlnerativity of Causal Explana­
tion: If A causally explains Band C causally explains D, then 
A&C causally explain B&D" (Neander et al. 460). Further­
more, since there will be no direct explanatory linkage be­
tween the physical realizations of an increase in the money 
supply and an increase in prices, we will have to instantiate 
a chain of explanations to connect the two. On the basis of this 
argument, one can conclude that an additional necessary 
condition for explanatory pervasion is transitivity: "Transi­
tivity of Causal Explanation: If A causally explains Band B 
ca usally explains C, then A causally explains C" (Neander et 
al. 460). Owens proceeds to attempt to show that both 
agglomerativity and transitivity do not always apply to 
explanation, casting doubt upon the thesis of explanatory 
pervasion. 
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First, we examine agglomerativity. To attack this thesis, 
Owens gives the following Aristotelian example: IIA man 
eats spicy food, and gets thirsty, and so goes out to the well, 
where he meets some ruffians who happen to be passing and 
who kill him. They did not come for the purpose of finding 
him, nor did they lure him there" (Owens 72). Herewehave 
a consequent (the man's murder) which is the result of joining 
two component physical processes (the arrival of the ruffians 
at the well at time t, and the arrival of the man at the well at 
time t) each of which have causal explanations: the man's 
eating spicy food, and the ruffians wishing to rest at the well. 
However, it cannot be said that the joining of these explana­
tions causally explains the joint arrival of the man and the 
ruffians at the well. This joint arrival has no proper explana­
tion; it is a coincidence. 
Owens claims that the reason thatagglomerativity fails in 
this case is that the individual explanations have no cornman 
element, just as the explanation of how lowering interest 
rates causes inflation has no (or very few) elements in com­
mon with an explanation of how the discovery of a new gold 
mine accomplishes the same effect (Owens 72). He contrasts 
these examples with a situation in which agglomerativity 
does hold because of sucha common element: ~hejointarrival 
of all of the members of an orchestra at an orchestra hall for 
a rehearsal can be explained by the fact that each member 
heard the conductor announce the time of the rehearsal 
(Owens 72). 
Karen Neanderand Peter Menzies agree with Owens that 
the agglomerativity of causal explanations does not always 
hold, but they disagree with his arguments to that effect. To 
illustrate their point, they redescribe the Aristotelian ex­
ample with different constituent explanations: 
The victim left home at 6 a.m., walked a distance D at 
an average velocity of V, and consequently arrived at 
the well at noon. The ruffians decamped at 9 a.m., 
walked a distance of D /2 at an average velocity of V, 
and also arrived at the well at noon. (Neander et al. 
461) 
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On the basis of these explanations, the simultaneous arrival 
of the man and the ruffians ceases to be coincidental; it is 
predictable from our explanations. But these explanations 
share no common element, for surely the man's motion is 
independent of any causal factors that brought about the 
ruffiansl motion. Hence, Owens's arguments are deficient. 
As an alternative reason to reject agglomerativity, the 
authors develop the idea that explanations are often invoked 
relative to a contrast class3: 
If we schematize the simplest kind of event as an 
object al s having property F at time tl then a request 
for a causal explanation of this event may be calling 
for different things: it may be calling for an explana­
tion of why the object a, rather than some other object, 
has F at t; or it may be calling for an explanation of 
why ahas property FI rather than some other prop­
ertyl at t; or it may be requesting an explanation for 
why ahas F at time t, rather than at some other time. 
(Neander et a1. 462) 
Relative to this idea, we can illuminate the differences be­
tween these two descriptions of the Aristotelian example. 
The most important factor of the event that we are consider­
ing is that the ruffians and the man arrived at the well at the 
same time. So we seek an explanation which will tell us why 
they all arrived at the well at that particular time, rather than 
some other time. In Owensls explanation, the component 
explanations tell us nothing about why the ruffians and the 
man arrived at tha t specific time; they merely tell us why they 
went to the welll as opposed to going somewhere else. 
Neander and Menzies's explanations, on the other handlgive 
a precise explanation of the times of arrival, and joining them 
does explain the two partiesl simultaneous arrival. Accord­
inglYI the authors concludel /I as far as we can see, 
agglomerativity holds provided that the contrast class of the 
compound explanation matches the contrast classes of the 
individual explanationsll (Neander et a1. 463). 
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On this account, we can see that the explanations of the 

individual instantiations of Fisher's Law still do not agglom­

erate: just as citing the specific mechanism for the rabbit's 

death did not explain why he was caught, citing the mecha­

nisms through which the rise in prices is achieved is insuffi­
cientto showwhy this inflation took place. We are not asking 
 II why the prices rose at that time, in that place, etc., but rather 
why they rose at all. Ifwe could formulate some explanation • 
that accounted for the reasons behind the inflation, as I did 
with the foxes and rabbits, I see no reason to believe that I 
agglomerativity would not hold for those explanations. 
To challenge the idea of the transitivity of causal explana­
tions, Owens looks at a well-known nursery rhyme: 

For want of a nail the shoe was lost, 

For want of a shoe the horse was lost, 
For want of a horse, the rider was lost, 
For want of a rider the battle was lost, 
For want of a battle the kingdom was lost, 
And all for want of a horseshoe nail. (Owens 
75) 
Owens casts doubt upon the validity of the inference in the 
last line. Neander and Menzies again agree with Owens that 
the transitivity of explanation does not always hold, and 
again they makestrong claims against the efficacy of Owens's 
arguments. Since the details of Owens's position are neither 
essential nor illuminative of the issue at hand, I will consider 
only the stance of Neander and Menzies on the issue. 
The authors invoke another facet of explanation to sup­
port their assertion: explanatory relevance. They note that 
"in asking for the causal explanation of some event ... one is 
asking for an explanatorily relevant causal condition" 
(Neander et a1. 464). Thus, the question arises: Are we 
justified in saying that PI-events of the type described in the 
thesis of explanatory pervasion are explanatorily relevant to 
P2-events? 
Neander and Menzies contend, correctly, in my opinion, 
that the answer is no. In most cases, the explanatory chain 
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will be too long for this to be true: 11 transitivity will fail in 
those cases in which the probability of the explanandum 
event falls below [aJ required threshold when we trace its 
causal ancestry far enough back" (Neander et al. 465). The 
nursery rhyme is one such case. The loss of a battle could 
reasonably bring about the loss of a kingdom; and one could 
suppose that the loss of a particular rider would be sufficient 
for the loss of the kingdom as welt ifthat rider were the king 
or some other vitally important political figure. But tha t is as 
far as we may go, say Neander and Menzies, for the loss of a 
horse does not make the loss of the kingdom sufficiently 
probable for us to say that it is explanatorily relevant. 
Is this true? Surely, one would think that if in reality the 
battle was lost for lack of one rider; and that rider was lost 
only bcause his horse collapsed, and that this in tum hap­
pened only because of a loose shoe, then the missing nail 
would indeed be necessary in an explanation of the event. To 
resolve this conflict, one must distinguish between explana­
tory relevance and causal relevance. The missing nail is 
causally relevant to the loss of the kingdom in the same way 
that "rabbit rentered into the capture space of foxfat time til 
is causally relevant to the death of the rabbit. But it is not 
explanatorily relevant, for the same reason that the rabbit's 
movements were not explanatorily relevant to its death: an 
explanation based on the missing nail is not useful for predic­
tion and prevention. Had a blacksmith taken more time to 
ensure that the horse's shoe was firmly affixed, would that 
have prevented the loss of the kingdom? Common sense tells 
us no: if the kingdom were so fragile that the death of one 
rider would determine its fate, we would guess that some 
other minor factor (a rusty sword, for example) would have 
caused its downfalL There are other, more important, factors 
in the kingdom's history (its military strength, recent politi­
cal happenings, economic stability, etc.) that acted to bring 
about this fragility, and a true, useful, explanation would cite 
these factors. 
It is interesting to note that this explication of the transi­
tivity of explanation is very closely related to the vindication 
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of agglomerativity. Again, we are dealing with contrst 
classes. The missing nail answers the question, "Why did the 
kingdom fall at this time, in this way, in thise as opposed to 
falling tomorrow, or to a different country, etc.?" An expla­
nation of the kingdom's collapse would more likely be seek­
ing hte answer to the question "Why did the kingdom fall at 
all, as opposed to continuing on for fity prosperous years?" 
Thus, a particular physical realization of the kingdom's 
downfall is not explanatorily relevant. 
Now thatwe see that explanatory trnasitivity is ot true in 
all cases, we are forced to reject the original concept of 
explanatory pervasion inasmuch as it is too strong. All is not 
lost, though, for we may still hold on to agglomerativity as 
long as we pay adequate attention to the contrast classes of 
high-level explanations. Thus, we can formulate a weaker 
version of thethesis. Neander and Menzies call it explanatory 
pervasion: 
If the occurrence of an 5
1
-event explains the occur­
rence of an 52-event then there are physical events PI 
and P2such that (a) the ocurrence of the Pt-event is 
sufficient for the occurrence of the 51-event; (b) the 
occurrence fo the P2-event is sufficient for the occur­
rence of the S2eventi and (c) there is aseries ofexplana­
tions linking the Pl-event with the P 2event. (Neander 
et al. 466) 
Conclusion 
Now we see that those authors who would reject a thesis 
of explanatory pervasion are being overly critical of the 
positivists'views. Indeed, a belief in the disunity of science 
and the autonomy of the spedal sciences goes against both 
commonsense and common practice in the scientific commu­
nity. This does not mean that traditional formulations of 
explanatory pervasion emerge from this debate unscathed. 
On the contrary, as I have shown above, in light of the failure 
of the transitivity of explanation it is necessary to reformulate 
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the thesis in the manner of Neander and Menzies. This new 
conception of explanatory unification, as opposed to theory 
unification, provides a promising common ground for phi­
losophers and scientists alike to share information across 
disciplines. 
WORKS CITED 
Boyd, Richard, Philip Gasper, and J.D. Trout, eds. The 
Philosophy ofScience!..Cambridge: The :MlTPress, 1991. 
Canlap,Rudolf. "Logical Foundations ofthe Unity ofSdence," 
Boyd et al. 393-404. 
Fodor, Jerry. "Special Sciences," Boyd et al. 429-41. 
Foss, Jeffrey. "Materialism, Reductionism, Replacement, 
and the Place of Consciousness in Science," The 
Journal ofPhilosophy 92 (1995): 401-29. 
Garfinkel, Alan. "Reductionism," Boyd et al. 443-59. 
Neander, Karen and Peter Menzies. "David Owens on Levels 
of Explanation," Mind 99 (1990): 459-66. 
Oppenheim, Paul and Hilary Puhlam. "Dnity of Science as a 
Working Hypothesis," Boyd et al. 405-27. 
Owens, David. "Levels of Explanation," Mind 98 (1989): 59­
79. 
Popper, Sir Karl. "Scientific Reduction and the Essential 
Incompleteness of All Science," The Open Universe: 
An Argument for Indeterminism, Totowa: Bowman 
and Littlefield, 1982. 
"Further Remarks on Reduction, 1981." The Open 
ANDREW MILLER 
Universe: An Argument for IndeterminismL Totowa: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1982. 
Trout, 	J.D. "Reductionism and the Unity of Science: 
Introductory Essay," Boyd et aL 387-92. 
NOTES 
1. Jerry Fodor, in "Special Sciences", does an especially 
good job of arguing against reductionism on appeals to ideas 
of lawlikeness. 
2. In these equations, the product XY represents the 
number of encounters between foxes and rabbits; a, bl PI and 
q are constants whose values are determined by fitting the 
observed datainan actual system. These equations are called 
the Lotka-Volterra equations, and readers who wish to ex­
plore their derivation inmore detail are referred to Garfinkel's 
sources: Braun, Differential Equations and Their Applications 
(New York: Springer-~erlag, 1975) and E.c. Pielou, An Intro­
duction to Mathematical Ecology (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 
1977). 
3. This idea was, I think, implicit in Garfinkel's argu­
ments. I believe his reasoning for why microexplanations 
often seem to miss their mark lines up perfectlywith this idea. 
